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Fast ﬂuxWe propose a method for detecting anomalous domain names, with focus on algorithmically
generated domain names which are frequently associated with malicious activities such as fast
ﬂux service networks, particularly for bot networks (or botnets), malware, and phishing. Our
method is based on learning a (null hypothesis) probability model based on a large set of
domain names that have been white listed by some reliable authority. Since these names are
mostly assigned by humans, they are pronounceable, and tend to have a distribution of charac-
ters, words, word lengths, and number of words that are typical of some language (mostly Eng-
lish), and often consist of words drawn from a known lexicon. On the other hand, in the present
day scenario, algorithmically generated domain names typically have distributions that are quite
different from that of human-created domain names. We propose a fully generative model for
the probability distribution of benign (white listed) domain names which can be used in an
anomaly detection setting for identifying putative algorithmically generated domain names.
Unlike other methods, our approach can make detections without considering any additional
(latency producing) information sources, often used to detect fast ﬂux activity. Experiments
on a publicly available, large data set of domain names associated with fast ﬂux service net-
works show encouraging results, relative to several baseline methods, with higher detection rates
and low false positive rates.
ª 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Cairo University.Introduction
Online bot networks (botnets) are used for spam, phishing,
malware delivery, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks,
as well as unauthorized data exﬁltration. Fast-ﬂux service net-
works (FFSNs) are an evasive type of bot network, employing
a large number of compromised IP addresses (machines) as
proxy slaves, with client requests to visit the web server ﬁrst re-
solved to the proxies and only then forwarded from them to
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robustness and longevity of an FFSN is attributable to rapid
ﬂuxing of the proxies (on the order of seconds or a few min-
utes), as well as possibly of the domain names themselves [1].
Recently developed botnets such as Conﬁcker, Kraken, and
Torpig use rapid domain name ﬂuxing, wherein the bots
DNS-query a series of randomly generated (synchronized by
a starting seed) candidate domain names. When a DNS query
is successful, the bot has the proper domain name to use in
engaging with the bot master in command and control
(C&C) communications. The apparent premise is that the large
number of domain-name candidates greatly increases the
(blacklisting) difﬁculty for a defense system, whereas the bot
master need only remember the names that it (periodically)
chooses to be DNS-registered [2,3]. Increasing the frequency
with which the master changes the registered domain name will
make it more difﬁcult for the bot master to be identiﬁed. Apart
from FFSNs, algorithmically generated domain names are also
used in spam emails to avoid detection based on domain name
and signature based blacklists. Direct approaches such as try-
ing to reverse engineer the random domain name generation
algorithm used by the bots may be highly time and resource
consuming, and may have a low success rate, given that the
bots can frequently change the algorithm used [4].
Several different strategies have been proposed to detect
FFSNs. One is to build supervised classiﬁers (based on labeled
benign and malicious network examples) which exploit fea-
tures extracted based on DNS querying that should indicate
fast ﬂux of widely distributed, compromised machines; e.g.,
the number of DNS A-records in a single lookup or in all look-
ups, the number of unique involved autonomous systems,
time-to-live, the domain’s age, and countries of registration
[1,2]. Separately, detection algorithms have been proposed to
identify fast domain-name ﬂuxing, both by distinguishing com-
puter-generated names from authentic, human-generated ones
and from detecting DNS failure signatures, inherent to fast do-
main ﬂux [3,5].
In Yadav et al. [3], the authors hypothesize that, in algorith-
mically choosing a long sequence of candidate domain names,
bots will tend to use distributions for letters/syllables/n-grams
that do not closely match the true distribution (associated with
valid domain names). One reason could be that e.g., in choos-
ing names from among the valid words in a dictionary, there is
non-negligible probability of choosing an existing (reserved)
domain name (or of achieving increased scrutiny by using a
name too close to an existing domain name). Moreover, it is
simply the case that current, existing FFSNs do not use the
most sophisticated mechanisms for stochastically generating
their (malicious) domain names. Yadav et al. [3] proposed a
trace-based approach, wherein either for an individual IP ad-
dress or for a connected clique of IP addresses, one measures
the empirical distribution of domain names on the n-gram
space. One can then use metrics such as the Kullback–Leibler
distance, the Jaccard index, and the string edit distance to mea-
sure how close the empirical distribution is to a distribution
based on a training set of valid domain names, and how close
to a distribution based either on known FFSN names or on
some assumed model for FFSN domain name generation. In
Al-Duwairi and Manimaran [6] and Al-Duwairi et al. [7], the
authors propose an interesting approach called ‘‘GFlux’’ for
detecting botnet based DDoS and fast ﬂux attacks using theGoogle search engine. In their approach, ﬁrst a list of IP ad-
dresses associated with a potentially malicious domain name
is found, and search queries based on its domain name and
IP addresses are then input to Google. A very small number
of hits (or search results) indicate that the domain is likely to
be associated with malicious activity.
The approach in Yadav et al. [3] is trace-based, requiring
the collection of a sufﬁcient number of domain names for
each IP address (or connected IP clique) to allow a reasonably
accurate empirical estimate of the n-gram (e.g., bigram) distri-
bution. Thus, it is inherently a high-latency method. More-
over, if there is relatively high ﬂux in the IP addresses, it
could be that there will be an insufﬁcient number of domain
names for each IP address (or IP address clique) to reason-
ably estimate the n-gram distribution. A disadvantage of the
GFlux approach is that it may trigger false positives in the
case of newly set-up, but legitimate DNS bindings with statis-
tically normal domain names. In this paper, we propose an
anomaly detection approach based on a fully generative prob-
ability model for the valid domain name space. The domain
name modeling uses techniques from natural language pro-
cessing and machine learning, and exploits the fact that valid
domain names are likely to contain words that are part of a
large (common) lexicon. Using such a (null hypothesis) mod-
el, estimated based on a large ‘‘training set’’ of valid domain
names, one can calculate the likelihood of any individual do-
main name candidate (obtained from spam email, from a
honeypot, or from a suspected web site). If the likelihood is
very low, then the domain name is detected as suspicious.
The advantage of this approach over Yadav et al. [3] and Ya-
dav and Reddy [5] is that it is a low latency method (uses a
pre-trained model of valid domain names) and makes no
underlying assumptions about the stochastic model bots use
in generating domain names.
It is worth mentioning that some recent works such as [8–
10] have also proposed methods for domain name generation.
In Crawford and Aycock [8], a domain name generation tool
called Kwyjibo was proposed, which is capable of generating
random, yet pronounceable strings that cannot be typically
found in the English language. This has applications in areas
like random generation of usernames, passwords, and domain
name strings which cannot be easily replicated. In Wagner
et al. [9], a method called Smart DNS brute-forcer was devel-
oped to synthesize new domain names for the purpose of
DNS probing. They used a simple generative model for do-
main names, wherein the empirical distribution of the number
of labels, the length of the labels, and the distribution of char-
acter n-grams in the labels are calculated on a training data set
of domain names. In Marchal et al. [10], the method of Wag-
ner et al. [9] was extended by leveraging semantic analysis of
domain names in order to make improved guesses for new
and related domain names, which can be useful for DNS prob-
ing. However, when considered in the context of the problem
of detecting algorithmically generated domain names, we
found that the domain name models proposed in these works
are quite simplistic and not well suited for this problem. We
evaluated the detection performance when the smart DNS
brute-forcer method proposed by Wagner et al. [9] is used
for modeling valid domain names, and found that our method
performs signiﬁcantly better, as shown in the experimental re-
sults section of this paper.
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In this section, we ﬁrst describe our method for pre-processing
and modeling valid domain names. Next, the method for esti-
mating the model parameters from a data set of valid domain
names is described. Finally, our anomaly detection method for
detecting suspicious, algorithmically generated domain names
(and thus distinguishing from valid domain names) is described.
Modeling of domain names
A domain name is a component of the Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) that is used to identify a device or a resource
on the Internet. It consists of one or more strings, called do-
mains, delimited by dots. For example, in the URL http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name, the domain name is
en.wikipedia.org. The rightmost domain in the domain name
is called the top level domain (TLD) (org in this example),
and the subsequent domains going from right to left are called
second level domain, third level domain, and so on. The com-
ponent strings of domain names can consist of English letters
‘a’ to ‘z’ (case insensitive), digits ‘0’ to ‘9’, and the character ‘-’
at some position other than the beginning or the end of the
string.
Compound splitting and pre-processing
The component strings in a domain name are usually formed
by concatenating valid English words, proper nouns, numbers,
abbreviated (compressed) words, acronyms, slang words, and
even words (phrases) from other languages transliterated into
English. A few examples are nytimes, yourﬁlehost, product-re-
views, craigslist, cricinfo, deutschebahn, and hdfc bank. In order
to learn meaningful models for domain names, it is useful to
perform some pre-processing on the component strings. First,
the top level domain and the generic ‘www’ are removed from
all the domain names. Then, the ‘’ and ‘-’ characters are con-
sidered as delimiters, and the domain name is split at the posi-
tion of these characters (i.e., ’’ and ‘-’ are replaced with a
single space), giving a number of substrings. If there are any
numbers in the substrings, the portion to the left and right
of the numbers (if any) are separated, and the numbers are dis-
carded. This is done because, under our generative model,
numbers (digits) are not likely to be informative about whether
the domain names were generated algorithmically. Supposing
that we have a large lexicon of words from the English lan-
guage,1 we may be able to parse out words from the domain
name substrings. For example, usatoday can be parsed into
usa today, hdfcbank can be parsed into hdfc bank (although
‘hdfc’ may not be a part of the word list). This problem, known
as compound splitting, word segmentation, or word breaking,
has been addressed before and some efﬁcient methods have
been developed to solve it [11–13]. However, some of these
methods can only split a string such that all the words in the
split are recognized by the word list. In the case of domain
names, this may not be very effective. Thus, we implemented
a method which can parse a string based on a large word list1 Such a list can be gathered from various Internet sources such as
word frequency lists, English language documents such as Wikipedia,
lists of common ﬁrst and last names, and lists of common technical
terms.and separate out the recognized words, even if there are unrec-
ognized substrings on either (or both) sides of the recognized
word strings. In particular, our method may parse a string
as: S1, W1, S2, where W1 is a valid word, but S1 and S2 are
unrecognized substring ‘‘phrases’’. To illustrate our parsing
steps, consider the example domain name www.imo-
vies4you.com. After processing and parsing, the substrings ex-
tracted will be ‘i’, ‘movies’, and ‘you’.
Markov modeling of the character sequence
A simple model for the substrings in a domain name is ob-
tained by modeling the joint probability of the characters,
assuming the parsed substrings are statistically independent
of each other. Suppose a domain name is represented by its
component substrings (w1, . . . ,wn), where the i-th substring of
length li is wi ¼ ðwi;1; . . . ;wi;liÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. We model its
probability as Pðw1; . . . ;wnÞ ¼
Qn
i¼1PðwiÞ. The joint probabil-
ity of characters in the substring wi can be generally written
as PðwiÞ ¼ Pðwi;1Þ
Qli
j¼2Pðwi;jjwi;j1; . . . ;wi;1Þ, where wi,j take
values from the set of English letters A. If we make a k-th or-
der Markov assumption (k< li) that wi,j is conditionally inde-
pendent of wi,1, wi,2, . . . ,wi,jk1 given wi,j1, wi,j2, . . . ,wi,jk,
then the joint probability is given by PðwiÞ ¼ Pðwi;1Þ
Qk
j¼2P
ðwi;jjwi;j1; . . . ;wi;1Þ
Qli
j¼kþ1Pðwi;jjwi;j1; . . . ;wi;jkÞ. Since the
number of probabilities needed to be estimated increases expo-
nentially with k, k is chosen to be small, typically in the range
2–5. Also, we assume that the conditional distribution of char-
acters is stationary, i.e., P(wi,j|wi,j1, . . . ,wi,jk) does not de-
pend on the position of the character, j.
Given a training set of strings, one can estimate the condi-
tional probabilities using the maximum likelihood (ML) or
maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation methods. However,
even for modestly large jAj and small k, using these methods
directly can result in noisy or even undeﬁned estimates for
some character tuples. This problem has been well studied in
the natural language processing literature, and addressed using
what are called smoothing or interpolation methods [14,15]. In
this paper, we focus on a method called Jelinek–Mercer
smoothing [16], in which higher order conditional probability
models are interpolated (smoothed) using lower order models.
In this method, the interpolated k-th order conditional proba-
bility model is a convex combination of the k-th order maxi-
mum likelihood estimated conditional probability model and
the interpolated (k  1)-th order conditional probability mod-
el. The interpolated conditional probability models for lower
orders are deﬁned in the same way, recursively. For example,
the conditional probability model for k= 3 is given by
Pintðwi;jjwi;j1;wi;j2;wi;j3Þ ¼ k3PMLðwi;jjwi;j1;wi;j2;wi;j3Þ
þ ð1 k3ÞPintðwi;jjwi;j1;wi;j2Þ; ð1Þ
where,
Pintðwi;jjwi;j1;wi;j2Þ ¼ k2PMLðwi;jjwi;j1;wi;j2Þ þ ð1 k2Þ
Pintðwi;jjwi;j1Þ;
Pintðwi;jjwi;j1Þ ¼ k1PMLðwi;jjwi;j1Þ þ ð1 k1ÞPMLðwi;jÞ
and PML refers to the maximum likelihood estimates. The
hyperparameters k1; k2; k3 2 ½0; 1 control the contribution of
the models of different orders. The method for setting these
hyperparameters is discussed in a later section. The motivation
426 J. Raghuram et al.behind this method is that when there is insufﬁcient data to
estimate a probability in the higher order models, the lower or-
der models can provide useful information and also avoid zero
or undeﬁned probabilities. It can be shown that the maximum
likelihood estimates are given by the normalized empirical fre-
quency counts over the training set of ‘‘known normal’’ (white
listed) domain names, i.e.,
PMLðwi;jjwi;j1; . . . ;wi;jkÞ¼ Nðwi;j;wi;j1; . . . ;wi;jkÞP
wi;j2ANðwi;j;wi;j1;wi;j2; . . . ;wi;jkÞ
;
ð2Þ
where N() denotes the frequency count on a training set. If
this probability model is learned based on a large training
set of valid domain names, the character tuples that occur fre-
quently in the training set will tend to have high probabilities,
and the character tuples that occur less frequently will have
low probabilities. A domain name generated randomly based
on some algorithm is likely to have character sequences which
have low probability under the valid domain name model, i.e.,
they are likely to be anomalies or outliers relative to the valid
domain name model. This is discussed further in the section
Anomaly detection approach.
Parametric modeling of the number of substrings and the
substring lengths
In addition to modeling the character sequences in the sub-
strings of a domain name, one would expect that it is useful
to model other characteristics of a domain name such as the
number of substrings it possesses (after pre-processing and
parsing), the total length (number of characters) in the domain
name, and the lengths of the component substrings, because
these features are likely to have different probability distribu-
tions on a set of valid domain names than on a set of algorith-
mically generated domain names. In order to substantiate this
claim, we calculated the empirical probability distributions of
these features on a data set of valid domain names and on a
data set of domain names associated with fast ﬂux or attack
activity (these data sets which are used in our experiments will
be described in a later section). The empirical probability mass
functions (PMFs) of the number of substrings, the total length
of the domain name, the length of the second substring, and
the length of the third substring estimated from each of the
data sets are compared in Fig. 1(a–d), which reveal substantial
differences. Accordingly, we now represent a domain name as
(n, l, l1, . . . , ln, w1, . . . ,wn), where n is the number of substrings,
l= l1+   + ln is the total length of the domain name, li,
i= 1, . . .,n are the substring lengths, and wi, i= 1, . . . ,n are
the substrings. The joint probability of the domain name
(assuming substring independence) can then be expressed as
PðN ¼ n;L ¼ l;L1 ¼ l1; . . . ;Ln ¼ ln;W1 ¼ w1; . . . ;Wn ¼ wnÞ
¼ PðN ¼ nÞPðL ¼ ljN ¼ nÞPðL1 ¼ l1; . . . ;Ln1
¼ ln1jL ¼ l;N ¼ nÞ
Yn
i¼1
PðWi ¼ wijLi ¼ liÞ; ð3Þ
where the uppercase and lowercase notations are used to
denote random variables and their corresponding values. To
simplify notation, we will drop the use of the uppercase, and
assume that the symbols identify the probability distributions.
That is, P(n) is the probability of a domain name having n sub-
strings, P(l|n) is the probability that the length of the domainname is l given that it has n substrings, P(l1, . . . , ln1|l, n) is
the joint probability of the substring lengths given the length
of the domain name and the number of substrings. Since these
probability distributions are unknown, a commonly used ap-
proach is to model them with suitable parametric distributions
and estimate the parameters of the distributions from a train-
ing data set. We next describe our choices for these.
Since the number of substrings in domain names does not
usually take a large value (In Fig. 1(a), the domain names with
more than 5 substrings have a negligible probability mass), we
decided to model P(n) directly with the empirical PMF, with a
smoothing factor added to avoid zero probabilities outside the
support of the training set
That is,
PðnÞ ¼ NðnÞ þ e
ndPNmax
m¼1NðmÞ þ 11þed
; n ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; ð4Þ
where d is a smoothing hyperparameter and Nmax is the max-
imum number of substrings over the domain names in the
training set. The method for setting d is discussed in a future
section. Next, we discuss our choice of model for P(l|n). Given
the number of substrings, we assume that the individual sub-
string lengths are statistically independent and that the length
of substring i follows a Poisson distribution with parameter li,
i.e.,
Pðlijn; liÞ ¼
elilli1i
ðli  1Þ! ; li ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;
where the domain of the distribution starts from 1 because the
length of a substring has to be at least 1 character. Given the
number of substrings N= n, it can be shown that the total
length L ¼Pni¼1Li also has a Poisson distribution with a
shifted domain and parameter l ¼Pni¼1li, given by
Pðljn; lÞ ¼ e
llln
ðl nÞ! ; l ¼ n; nþ 1; . . . : ð5Þ
Another property of independent Poisson distributed ran-
dom variables is that, given their sum L= l, the joint distribu-
tion of the random variables Li, i= 1, . . . ,n  1 is a
multinomial distribution (ln is deterministic given l and li,
i= 1, . . . ,n  1). In this case, it follows that
Pðl1; . . . ; ln1jl; n; lÞ ¼ ðl nÞ!ðl1  1Þ!    ðln  1Þ!
Yn
i¼1
li
l
 li1
;
li ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; ð6Þ
where l= (l1, . . . ,ln).
The joint distribution of characters in a substring, given
their lengths is chosen as the interpolated model
PintðwijliÞ ¼
Qli
j¼1Pintðwi;jjwi;j1; . . . ;wi;jk; liÞ, which was dis-
cussed earlier. An alternate, more sophisticated model for
the substrings which makes use of word lists is discussed in
the next section.
From the discussion so far, we have a fully generative mod-
el, consistent with the following stochastic domain name gen-
eration steps:
1. Select the number of substrings n by sampling from the dis-
tribution P(n).
2. Select the total length of the domain name l by sampling
from the Poisson distribution P(l|n; l) .
(a) Number of substrings 
(c) Length of second substring 
(b) Total length 
(d) Length of third substring
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
number of words
Em
pi
ric
al
 P
ro
b
Normal
Attack
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
substring 2 length
Em
pi
ric
al
 p
ro
b
Attack
Normal
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
total length
Em
pi
ric
al
 p
ro
b
Attack
Normal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Substring 3 length
Em
pi
ric
al
 p
ro
b
Normal
Attack
Fig. 1 Plots of empirical PMF of the number of substrings, total length, length of the second substring, and length of the third substring
estimated on a data set of normal domain names and on a data set of attack domain names.
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sampling from the multinomial distribution P(l1, . . . , ln1|l,
n; l).
4. Independently, for each substring of length li, generate the
character sequence wi according to the model Pint(w|li) .Modeling recognized word occurrences in domain names
So far, the model presented for substrings in a domain name
considered the joint distribution of its characters, making some
conditional independence assumptions. Although such a model
captures dependencies between sequences of characters, it does
not take into account the possibility that one or more sub-
strings (obtained from the parsing step) could be part of a lex-
icon or vocabulary, as is often the case with domain names. As
we discussed earlier, domain names are usually created by hu-
mans by concatenating words from their vocabulary, which
also include proper nouns abbreviations, acronyms, slang
words, etc. Using a suitably collected eclectic word list that is
representative of words usually found in valid domain names,
it is possible to develop a more sophisticated model for the sub-
strings in valid domain names. Also, algorithmically generated
domain names which are usually part of some maliciousactivity such as FFSNs are unlikely to contain substrings which
are part of a word list [3]. Hence, it should be useful to learn a
model of valid domain names which combines both the joint
probability of the character sequences, and the probability of
occurrence of recognized words from a word list.
Consider a word list V ¼ fv1; . . . ; vMg with M words and
with maximum word length lmax. Let V l be the set of words
of length l, such that
Slmax
l¼1 V l ¼ V. Let ql() be a PMF on the
words of length l from the word list, such thatP
v2V l qlðvÞ ¼ 1. Let IðcÞ be the binary indicator function,
which takes a value 1 (0) if the condition c is true (false). Also,
let El be the binary random variable which takes a value 1 (0) if
a substring of length l belongs to (does not belong to) the word
list. We propose to model a substring w of length l, given that it
belongs to the word list, via the following mixture model:
Pdðwjl;El¼ 1Þ¼ pqlðwÞþð1pÞPintðwjl;El¼ 1Þ
¼ pqlðwÞþð1pÞ
PintðwjlÞIðw2V lÞP
v2AlPintðvjlÞIðv2V lÞ
;
¼ pqlðwÞþð1pÞ
PintðwjlÞIðw2V lÞP
v2V lPintðvjlÞ
; 8w2Al
ð7Þ
2 We treat the occurrence or non-occurrence of a substring in the
word list also as observed data.
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word list according to the PMF ql(w), rather than Pint(w|l,
El = 1). The PMF Pint(w|l, El = 1) is the joint probability of
the characters in the substring with the interpolated model,
conditioned on the event that the substring is in the word list,
and the ﬁnal simpliﬁed expression in (7) is obtained by apply-
ing Bayes rule. For substrings of length l which are not part of
the word list, we use the joint probability of the characters in
the substring with the interpolated model, conditioned on the
event that the substring is not in the word list, given by
Pintðwjl;El ¼ 0Þ ¼ PintðwjlÞIðw R V lÞP
v2AlPintðvjlÞIðw R V lÞ
;
¼ PintðwjlÞIðw R V lÞ
1Pv2V lPintðvjlÞ ; 8w 2 Al
ð8Þ
Also, let c e [0,1] be the prior probability of selecting a sub-
string from the word list.
For this model, only step 4 of the domain name generation
mechanism described earlier for the character based model has
to be modiﬁed as follows. Independently, for each substring of
length li:
(i) Choose with probability c whether the substring should
be selected from Vli , or from its complement.
(ii) If the substring is to be selected from Vli , then select one
of the components di e {1,2} according to the probabil-
ity p. If di = 1, select a word from Vli according to the
PMF qliðwÞ. If di = 2, select a word from Vli according
to the PMF P intðwjli;Eli ¼ 1Þ given by (7).
(iii) If the substring is to be selected from Ali n Vli , then gen-
erate a character sequence according to the joint distri-
bution Pint(w|li). If the generated substring is in the
word list, reject it, and re-sample until a substring not
in the word list is obtained.
At this point, it is worth mentioning that this composite
mixture-based-model, which takes into account word occur-
rences from a word list, while also modeling the number of
substrings and the substring lengths is our novel proposed
model for domain names.
Learning the model parameters
In the previous section, we discussed our proposed probability
model for domain names. We now discuss how the parameters
of this model can be estimated using a data set of valid domain
names.
Maximum likelihood and Expectation Maximization
We use the well-known maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) framework [17,18], wherein the parameters of a proba-
bility model are found by maximizing the likelihood of a train-
ing data set under that model. Consider a training set of valid
domain names given by X ¼ fðnt; lt; lt;1; . . . ; lt;nt ;wt;1; . . . ;
wt;ntÞ; t ¼ 1; . . . ;Tg. It can be shown that the MLE solution
for the parameter li in the Poisson distribution of the length
of substring i is given by
li ¼
XT
t¼1:nt P i
ðlt;i  1Þ
, XT
t¼1:nt P i
1:The distribution P(n) is directly calculated using (4). We as-
sume that the conditional probabilities of the character tuples
in Pint(w|l) are front-end estimated using (2) on the entire train-
ing data set. The parameters of the mixture model are c and
h ¼ fp; fqlðvÞ; 8v 2 V l; l ¼ 1; . . . ; lmaxgg. The portion of the
log-likelihood of the data2 X which depends on these parame-
ters is given by
Lðh;XÞ ¼
X
x2X
Xn
i¼1
Iðwi 2 V liÞ
 log cþ logðpqliðwiÞ þ ð1 pÞPintðwli jli;Eli ¼ 1ÞÞ
 
þ
X
x2X
Xn
i¼1
ð1 Iðwi 2 V liÞÞ logð1 cÞ½
þ logPintðwijli;Eli ¼ 0Þ;
where x is used as shorthand for ðn; l; l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wlnÞ. It
can be easily shown that the MLE estimate for c is
c ¼
XT
t¼1
Xnt
i¼1
Iðwt;i 2 V lt;iÞ
,XT
t¼1
nt;
which is just the proportion of substrings in the domain name
training set which are from the word list.
The MLE solution for the parameters in h, subject to the
appropriate constraints, does not have a closed form solution.
However, a widely used method for solving problems of this
kind involving mixture models is the Expectation Maximiza-
tion (EM) algorithm [18,19], which ﬁnds a local maximum of
the log-likelihood by iteratively maximizing a lower bound,
one which is both easier to maximize and which usually has
a closed form maximizer. At each iteration, the maximizer of
the lower bound necessarily increases the value of the log-like-
lihood, and the iterations are repeated until a local maximum
of the log-likelihood is found. For our problem, the EM algo-
rithm can be summarized as follows:
1. Initialize parameters: We chose the initialization p= 0.5
and qð0Þl ðvÞ ¼ 1jVl j ; 8v 2 Vl; l ¼ 1; . . . ; lmax:
2. Iterate: For r= 0, 1, 2, . . ., until Lðh;XÞ converges
(a) E-Step: For t= 1, . . . ,T, and i e {1, . . . ,nt,i} such that
wt;i 2 Vlt;i , calculate the component posteriorP dt;i ¼ 1jwt;i; lt;i; hðrÞ
 
¼ p
ðrÞqðrÞlt;i ðwt;iÞ
pðrÞqðrÞlt;i ðwt;iÞ þ ð1 pðrÞÞPint wlt;i jlt;i;wt;i 2 V lt;i
 	 ; ð9Þ
where the superscript r on the parameters denotes their value
at the r-th EM iteration.
(b) M-Step: Re-estimate the parameterspðrþ1Þ ¼
PT
t¼1
Pnt
i¼1P dt;i ¼ 1jwt;i; lt;i; hðrÞ
 
Iðwt;i 2 VÞPT
t¼1
Pnt
i¼1Iðwt;i 2 VÞ
; ð10Þ
q
ðrþ1Þ
l ðvÞ ¼
PT
t¼1
Pnt
i¼1P dt;i ¼ 1jwt;i; lt;i; hðrÞ
 
Iðwt;i ¼ vÞPT
t¼1
Pnt
i¼1P dt;i ¼ 1jwt;i; lt;i; hðrÞ
 
Iðwt;i 2 V lÞ
;
8v 2 V l; 8l: ð11Þ
Unsupervised, low latency anomaly detection 429Setting the hyperparameters
Recall that the interpolation weights k1; k2; . . . in (1), and the
smoothing factor d in (4) are hyperparameters. They are not
estimated using the training data in order to avoid over-ﬁtting,
and are usually set using a separate validation data set, if avail-
able. Instead, we use 10-fold cross-validation (CV). In our
model, the choice of parameters k1; k2; . . . is independent of
the choice of d. Each of the k1; k2; . . . is varied over twenty val-
ues in [0,1] and the combination of values which has the largest
average log-likelihood on the held out folds is chosen. Simi-
larly d is chosen from a set of twelve values in the interval
[0.001,100].
Anomaly detection approach
Once the parameters of the domain name models are estimated
using a data set of valid domain names, the model can be used
for detecting anomalous or algorithmically generated domain
names. A natural choice for the test statistic for this detection
problem is the logarithm of the joint probability of the test
domain name under our estimated model of valid domain
names. If this value is smaller than a threshold, then we decide
that the test domain name is an anomaly. We next consider a
number of different test statistics based on progressively more
complex models of domain names, consistent with our earlier
developments.
First we consider only the interpolated model for the char-
acter sequences in the substrings of a domain name. For a do-
main name represented by the vector (n, l, l1, . . . , ln, w1, . . . ,wn),
the test (decision) statistic is given by
T
ðcÞ
1 ðn; l; l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wnÞ¼
Xn
i¼1
logPintðwijliÞ
¼
Xn
i¼1
Xli
j¼1
logPintðwi;jjwi;j1; . . . ;wi;jkÞ:
ð12Þ
The domain name is declared anomalous if T
ðcÞ
1 ðn; l;
l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wnÞ < g, where g is a suitably chosen thresh-
old. However, in this approach, we are comparing the joint
probabilities of domain names with different numbers of sub-
strings and different substring lengths against the same thresh-
old. As the length of a substring increases, the support of its
joint probability increases exponentially. Therefore, the joint
probability of a character sequence tends to decrease with
increasing length. As a result, longer length sequences may
be biased to get detected more often as anomalies than shorter
length ones. In an attempt to correct this bias, we propose the
following modiﬁcations of the test statistic (12).
T
ðcÞ
2 ðn; l; l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wnÞ
¼
Xn
i¼1
log
PintðwijliÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
E½PintðWijliÞ
p !; ð13Þ
and
T
ðcÞ
3 ðn; l; l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wnÞ
¼
Xn
i¼1
logPintðwijliÞ  E½logPintðWijliÞð Þ; ð14Þ
where the expected values are given byE½PintðWijliÞ ¼
X
wi;12A
  
X
wi;li2A
Yli
j¼1
Pintðwi;jjwi;j1; . . . ;wi;jkÞ2;
and
E½logPintðWijliÞ ¼
Xli
j¼1
X
wi;12A
  
X
wi;j2A
Yj
l¼1
Pintðwi;ljwi;l1; . . . ;wi;lkÞ
 logPintðwi;jjwi;j1; . . . ;wi;jkÞ:
Since our model assumes the joint distribution of the char-
acters to be a simple Bayesian network, the above summations
over the character tuples can be computed efﬁciently using the
Sum-Product algorithm (message passing) [20]. The idea behind
dividing by the square root of the expected value in T
ðcÞ
2 is that
it acts like an l2 (Euclidean) norm of the vector of joint prob-
abilities over all possible input tuples. In the case of T
ðcÞ
3 , the
idea is that the logarithm of the joint probability of the sub-
strings should have different mean values for different sub-
string lengths, and we subtract off the mean value.
Next, we consider the fully generative model which includes
the probability distribution of the number of substrings, the
total length of the domain name, and the individual substring
lengths. Deﬁning
gðn; l; l1; . . . ; lnÞ ¼ logPðnÞ þ logPðljn; lÞ
þ logPðl1; . . . ; ln1jl; n; lÞ;
the test statistics for a domain name (n, l, l1, . . . , ln, w1, . . . ,wn)
are given byeTðcÞi ðn; l; l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wnÞ ¼ gðn; l; l1; . . . ; lnÞ
þ TðcÞi ðn; l; l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wnÞ;
i ¼ 1;2;3: ð15Þ
Finally, for our proposed mixture distribution which also
models word occurrences from a word list, we evaluate the fol-
lowing test statistics.
T
ðWÞ
1 ðn; l; l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wnÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
Iðwi 2 V liÞ log½cPdðwijli;Eli
¼ 1Þ þ
Xn
i¼1
Iðwi R V liÞ
 log ð1 cÞPintðwijli;Eli ¼ 0Þ½ ;
ð16Þ
and
T
ðWÞ
2 ðn; l; l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wnÞ
¼ gðn; l; l1; . . . ; lnÞ þ TðWÞ1 ðn; l; l1; . . . ; ln;w1; . . . ;wnÞ: ð17Þ
Note that in this case it is not clear how to apply bias cor-
rection for variable length substrings, since this model consid-
ers not only the joint distribution of the characters, but also
the probability of occurrence of words from a word list. We
consider the methods using test statistics in (12)–(15) as base-
line approaches, with the test statistic for our proposed ap-
proach given in (16) and (17).
As another baseline method for comparison, we imple-
mented the domain name modeling method of the Smart
DNS brute-forcer [9,10], which simply models the label
substrings in a domain name with a ﬁrst order Markov model
for the character sequences, as we discussed in the
430 J. Raghuram et al.Introduction section. We used the logarithm of the joint prob-
ability under this model as a test statistic for detection.
For all the above variants of the test statistic, the decision
rule (normal or anomaly) is based on comparison with a
threshold, which can be chosen such that the false positive rate
is equal to a. The false positive rate cannot be computed ex-
actly, and hence is approximated using a sampling estimate.
Alternatively, one could model the univariate distribution of
the test statistic with a suitable parametric density (e.g., Gauss-
ian, Student’s t, Gamma density, etc.), for which it may be pos-
sible to compute the false positive rate directly. The detection
rate and false positive rate performances of these test statistics
are compared in the next section.
Results and discussion
We obtained a data set of valid (benign) domain names and a
data set of attack domain names associated with fast ﬂux activ-
ity from http://pcsei.twbbs.org/datasets/-1-fast-ﬂux-attaack-
datasets. They collected a list of benign domain names from
sources such as well-known top websites listed by Alexa0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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Fig. 2 ROC curves for the test statistics based on the joint distributio
names.(http://www.alexa.com/topsites), and lists of popular blogs.
They collected the fast ﬂux data sets from sources such as AT-
LAS (http://atlas.arbor.net/summary/fastﬂux), domain name
system blacklists (http://www.dnsbl.info/), and FluXOR [2].
The data set of benign domains has 90,588 names and the fast
ﬂux attack data set has 25,210 names. We held out 5000 ran-
domly selected benign domain names as part of the test set
for calculating the false positive rates. The entire set of attack
domain names is used in the test set for calculating the detec-
tion rates. We collected a large list of words from internet
sources such as the Wiktionary frequency lists (http://en.wik-
tionary.org/wiki/Wiktionary:Frequency_lists), a text corpus
from project Gutenberg (http://norvig.com/big.txt), a list of
common male and female ﬁrst and last names (http://www.
census.gov/genealogy/www/data/1990surnames/names_ﬁles.
html), and a list of common technical terms (http://www.
techterms.com/list/a). The word list collected from these
sources is used by the method which models word occurrences.
Receiver Operation Characteristic (ROC) curves are plot-
ted for all the test statistics discussed in the previous section.
The ROC curve is plotted by varying a threshold on the test0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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n of character sequences in the substrings parsed out of the domain
Unsupervised, low latency anomaly detection 431statistic, and for each threshold value calculating the detection
rate and false positive rate on the test data set. In our problem,
the detection rate is the fraction of attack domain names that
are correctly detected as attack, and the false positive rate is
the fraction of benign domain names that are incorrectly
detected as attack. Recall that the decision rule is to declare
a domain name as attack if its test statistic is smaller than a
threshold, and declare it as benign otherwise. The area under
the ROC curve (AUC) is frequently used as a ﬁgure of merit,
with larger areas corresponding to better performance (with a
maximum value of 1).
Performance using only character modeling
We made a third order (k= 3) Markov dependency assump-
tion on the joint distribution of characters for all the methods
developed in this paper. First, we evaluated the performance of
the baseline test statistics T
ðcÞ
1 , T
ðcÞ
2 , and T
ðcÞ
3 (deﬁned in (12)–
(14)), which are based only on character modeling of the sub-
strings representing the domain names. The corresponding
ROC curves and their AUC values are shown in Fig. 2(a–c).
The test statistic T
ðcÞ
1 , which is simply the logarithm of the joint0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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Fig. 3 ROC curves for the test statistics based on the distribution
individual substrings, and the joint distribution of characters.probability, has a relatively good detection performance.
Among the modiﬁed test statistics, which attempt to handle
the problem of comparing variable length domain names,
T
ðcÞ
2 gives a small improvement in the AUC, but T
ðcÞ
3 performs
poorly compared to the other two.
We also evaluated the effect of parsing the domain names
as a pre-processing step. Instead of learning the Markov char-
acter transition probabilities from the parsed domain names
(where the substrings are assumed to be independently gener-
ated), we just treated the domain names as a single character
sequence. For this experiment we used the test statistic T
ðcÞ
2 ,
and the ROC curve is shown in Fig. 2(d). Although the perfor-
mance without parsing using the character based model does
not change much compared to the performance with parsing
applied, we will see that the use of word modeling from a word
list (which is used to model strings once they are parsed) gives
signiﬁcant improvement.
Value of modeling the number of substrings and substring lengths
Next, we evaluated the method which models the number of
substrings, the total length, and the length of the individual0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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of the number of substrings, the total length, the length of the
Table 1 Examples of valid and attack test set domain names
shown to illustrate some of the challenges in this detection
problem.
Parsed domain name p-Value under null model Valid or attack
nkotb 0.090852 Valid
kdo od govern 0.090903 Attack
sua od years 0.090997 Attack
epupz 0.091044 Valid
asxetos 0.092950 Valid
ngo duck half 0.094218 Attack
cqu od federal 0.094246 Attack
loser boi music blog spot 0.094316 Valid
cool veg if exot 0.094363 Attack
images wun bit ip 0.094422 Attack
circle mat i me pav 0.094657 Attack
bauex per ten forum 0.094719 Valid
kreuz 0.110932 Valid
432 J. Raghuram et al.substrings, in addition to modeling the characters in the sub-
strings. For this model, the ROC curves corresponding to
the test statistics eTðcÞi ; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (deﬁned in (15)) are shown
in Fig. 3(a–c). We observe that there is a small decrease in
the AUC value in this case. Based on the clear difference be-
tween the empirical distributions of these features in Fig. 1,
one would expect that modeling these feature distributions
should increase the chance of detecting algorithmically gener-
ated domain names. Presumably, on this data set, just model-
ing the joint distribution of the characters in the domain names
with the interpolated model captures the distribution of nor-
mal domain names well. Another reason could be that the sin-
gle parameter Poisson distribution does not offer enough
ﬂexibility for modeling the length of the substrings well. Eval-
uating this model on other data domains of fast ﬂux activity
may give us a better understanding of this phenomenon. Next,
we discuss the detection performance of the baseline domain
name modeling method of Wagner et al. [9]. The ROC curve
for this method, shown in Fig. 3(d) has signiﬁcantly lower
detection performance compared to the other methods devel-
oped in this paper. This is not surprising since this domain
name model considers only ﬁrst order character dependencies,
does not use any smoothing method, or model the occurrence
of recognized words from a vocabulary as we do. Note that the
method of [3] also uses only character bigram probabilities in
calculating metrics for anomaly detection.Value of modeling word occurrences from a word list
Finally, we evaluated our most sophisticated proposed meth-
od, which also models the probability of occurrence of words
from the word list we collected. The ROC curves for the test
statistics T
ðwÞ
1 and T
ðwÞ
2 (deﬁned in (16) and (17)) are shown in
Fig. 4(a and b). We observe that this method has the best
AUC performance, as compared to the methods which use
only character modeling for the substrings in the domain
name. On this data set, a high detection rate of about 0.9
can be achieved with a false positive rate of less than 0.1.
The improvement in performance can be explained by the
fact that valid domain names are usually embedded with0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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Fig. 4 ROC curves for the test statistics based on the moderecognizable words from a vocabulary. Also, domain names
associated with fast ﬂux activity do not usually contain mean-
ingful words or phrases, since fast ﬂuxing activity typically
requires a large number of frequently generated domain
names that do not already exist in the DNS. Thus, using
deterministic patterns from a ﬁnite vocabulary would de-
crease the number of possible unique domain names (making
domain name fast ﬂuxing less effective). However, in our
experiments we have observed that in some cases domain
names associated with attack or malicious activity also con-
tain some valid words embedded in the middle of randomly
generated character sequences. On the other hand, we also
observed that some valid domain name strings do not have
much informative content. For example, they could be short
acronyms, abbreviations, or slang words which may get de-
tected as anomalies under the valid domain name model.
To give some examples for both these scenarios, Table 1
shows a portion of valid and attack test set domain names
ranked in order of increasing p-values (which are approxi-
mately calculated by sampling). Note than under a good
model for valid domain names, anomalous domain names
should have small p-values (close to 0).0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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ling of substrings with word occurrences from a word list.
Unsupervised, low latency anomaly detection 433Conclusions
We proposed a method for generatively modeling the valid do-
main name space using natural language processing tech-
niques, which can be used in an anomaly detection setting to
detect suspicious looking (or algorithmically generated) do-
main names. The detection performance of our method on a
real data set of malicious domain names associated with fast-
ﬂux activity is encouraging. We wish to emphasize that this
detection of domain names associated with fast ﬂux activity
is based solely on modeling a representation of the domain
names, and does not use any other background information
like DNS lookups, or packet trace collection and analysis,
which may be expensive and which can induce delay in the
decision making. At the same time, there are limits to the
detection performance achievable using only the domain name
character strings. As discussed in the Results section, some va-
lid domain names may just be short strings like acronyms or
abbreviations (for example www.cbs.com, www.cnn.com),
which do not have much information. On the other hand,
some of the attack, fast ﬂux, and blacklisted domain names
used in our experiments have valid words concatenated with
random-looking sequences, presumably to maximize their de-
gree of confounding. Given these challenges, a detector based
solely on domain names may be most effectively used as part
of a larger detector/classiﬁer system which uses additional dis-
criminating features. Such a system could also be extended to
an active learning framework which automatically identiﬁes
the best new samples to label by feasibly involving a human
operator in the loop.
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